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The core problem with parallel imports is that the welfare e®ects are ambiguous. A policy that admits parallel imports of pharmaceuticals involves at least two important trade-o®s. In terms of dynamic e±ciency, there is a tension between two major public-policy objectives; innovation and development of new drugs on the one hand and welfare of patients, which may require costcontainment strategies, on the other. The research-intensive pharmaceutical industry relies heavily on patents, which provide a limited period of marketing exclusivity within which innovators may recoup their drug development costs. The value of the patent depends on its scope, including de¯nition of the geographical area over which patent rights are exhausted upon¯rst sale. The narrower the area of exhaustion, the greater the scope for price-di®erentiation. Consequently, incentives to innovate are stronger at the expense of consumer welfare in high{price countries. In this context, permission of parallel imports could reduce incentives to innovate while consumers in high-price countries gain.
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The second trade-o® involves static e±ciency, which is determined by the costs and bene¯ts of parallel trade. The short-run welfare e®ect is more likely to be positive for a country with high pharmaceutical prices when the real resources used in arbitrage activities are small relative to the e®ects stemming from price moderation. It is worth noting that a positive static e®ect of parallel trade is a necessary but not su±cient condition for the total e®ect to be positive.
The tension between policy objectives is evident in EU case law importantly, it does not extend to countries outside the common market (EMI v CBS, case C-51/75 and Silhouette v Hartlauer, case C-355/96). Thus, the ECJ has established a principle of "community exhaustion" but rejected the idea of international exhaustion. Moreover, the principle of community exhaustion does not extend to cases where the goods are sold in a member state under a compulsory license, as established in Pharmon v Hoechst (C-19/84). To summarize, the EU system essentially mandates free parallel imports within its territory, despite the existence of national intellectual property regimes and price controls, so long as the manufacturer has placed the good voluntarily on the market.
Despite the theoretically ambiguous relationship between welfare and parallel trade in R&D-intensive industries, direct estimates of the costs and bene¯ts of parallel trade are rare. The aim of this paper is, therefore, to study the effects of parallel trade in the pharmaceutical industry. Our attention is limited to the static impacts and we do not consider the dynamic e®ects on R&D in the long run. Thus, the analysis focuses on explaining the volume and costs of parallel imports, the entry of parallel importers, the strategic responses by pharmaceutical¯rms, and the e®ects of these activities on prices.
The motivation for this limitation is to keep the analysis tractable within the con¯nes of available data. Note, however, that unless we¯nd a positive static e®ect we cannot expect a net positive e®ect, including dynamic impacts, of parallel trade in pharmaceutical products.
The paper presents a simple two-country model of arbitrage. Income levels di®er between the two markets and pharmaceutical companies have an incentive to price-discriminate between markets. It is assumed that price ceilings in the exporting nation are exogenously given and, accordingly, an optimal system of price regulation is not derived. In the¯rst speci¯cation we assume that the potential volume of arbitrage is unlimited. In the second speci¯cation we derive an endogenous choice of maximum potential parallel imports. While the limit here is a choice variable, one motivation for this idea is that parallel importers could face problems in¯nding more than a limited quantity in export markets. A related contribution is Klepper (1992) , who presents a simple model of a price-discriminating monopoly that is exposed to price controls in one market and faces limited arbitrage between markets.
The theoretical analysis yields a number of hypotheses. First, if the potential volume of arbitrage is unlimited, the manufacturing¯rm would deter parallel imports by reducing its price in the home market for products that are sub ject to possible parallel trade. Second, if the potential volume of arbitrage is small, the manufacturing¯rm would accommodate parallel imports and the price in the home market would fall in the volume of actual parallel trade.
In the empirical part we informally test our theoretical hypotheses on data from the Swedish market during 1995-1998. The Swedish market provides a natural test for our theoretical hypotheses. Before 1995 Sweden prohibited parallel imports of pharmaceutical products. However, entry into the European Union, on January 1, 1995, required Sweden to allow them.
For this purpose we have compiled a unique set of data consisting of prices for 50 major pharmaceutical products, the sales of patent holders, the identity and time of entry of parallel importers, volumes of parallel imports, and the sources of parallel imports. Because we use data assembled on a detailed product level the price comparisons are not sub ject to the methodological problems with general price comparisons discussed in Danzon and Chao (1998) .We¯nd that prices in Sweden of drugs subject to parallel imports have fallen relative to other pharmaceutical prices, with the e®ect concentrated at the end of the period.
However, in a restricted data set we¯nd that parallel imports have not resulted in convergence of wholesale prices between Sweden and the countries providing the exports.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The theoretical model of parallel imports is presented in section 2. The hypotheses from the theoretical analysis are investigated in section 3 and section 4 contains concluding remarks.
The Economics of Parallel Imports
Consider a model with two markets -home and foreign -denoted h and f .
Throughout the analysis the home market is the high-income country and the foreign market the low-income country. A representative consumer in market i = h; f has income m i , where m h > m f . Demand for a speci¯c pharmaceutical product is
for market i = h; f , where¯i is proportional to the marginal utility of money and decreasing in m i . 3 It is assumed that no substitution with other pharmaceutical products or therapies is possible. There is an autonomous government in the foreign country with a capacity to set a price cap in its own market without intervention. The price cap in market f is denoted b p f . The price cap in the foreign market is always binding.
We assume that there is a small number of symmetric parallel-importinḡ rms, n, with a total arbitrage capacity of k, which can be in¯nitely large or 
The strategic interaction is modelled as a multi-stage game. In the¯rst stage, each parallel-importing¯rm i orders a quantity k i from a wholesaler in the foreign market. The order quantity k i is immediately made known to all other¯rms. In the second stage, the manufacturing¯rm sets prices in both markets, p m h and p m f ; subject to the exogenously given price cap b p f . Prices are made public. In the third stage, the parallel-importing¯rm sets a price in the import market,ships a quantity q a i and markets clear. In the theoretical analysis we consider two situations. The¯rst situation is a benchmark with unlimited arbitrage. More formally, the arbitrage capacity k i is not binding in the last stage of the game.
In the second situation, arbitrage is limited. It is assumed that the order quantity in the¯rst stage is a binding constraint on the volume of arbitrage.
Parallel importing¯rms can choose to limit arbitrage and the total volume of arbitrage is endogenously determined.
Parallel imports lead to price convergence
A natural benchmark is an equilibrium in which potential arbitrage is unrestricted and the maximum volume is never a binding constraint on the quantity shipped by the parallel-importing¯rms. In this case these¯rms have an incentive to undercut the price set by the manufacturing¯rm in the home market as long as the price di®erence is larger than the trade cost. The manufacturinḡ rm achieves no sales in the home market as long as parallel imports occur. The only way to obtain any sales in the home market is to deter parallel imports by setting a price in the home market that makes parallel imports unpro¯table.
Thus, we de¯ne a deterrence strategy as a manufacturer's price that precludes parallel imports. An alternative strategy is accommodation, in which the manufacturer permits the level of trade chosen by the parallel-importing¯rms and prices accordingly. When potential arbitrage is unlimited, deterrence is more pro¯table than accommodation. The deterrence strategy results in a per-unit revenue equal to the price in the foreign market plus the trade cost, while under accommodation the manufacturer sells only in the foreign market and its perunit revenue is the foreign price. In other words, price convergence is a result of the manufacturer's response to potential arbitrage rather than actual parallel trade activities. 
Any price p m h < b p f + t deters parallel imports but results in less pro¯t than
This result is worth commentary. The threat of parallel imports results in price convergence relative to the segmented equilibrium. More speci¯cally, prices converge (up to variable trade cost) due to a price reduction in the home market while the price in the foreign market remains unchanged. Interestingly, potential arbitrage is su±cient to induce price convergence and no parallel imports occur in equilibrium. From a welfare point of view this is desirable as no real resources are used in arbitrage activities.
A related point is that both the price e®ect in the home market and price convergence are unrelated to the volume or share of parallel imports, and the change in average price in the home market is identical to the change of the manufacturer's price.
Costly trade activities
The e®ects of parallel trade are sensitive to the existence of a constraint on the maximum volume of parallel imports. In particular, a quantity constraint on parallel trade gives the manufacturing¯rm an incentive to accommodate rather than to deter parallel imports. The manufacturing¯rm prefers to sell a somewhat smaller quantity, speci¯cally its residual demand, in the home market at a higher price instead of reducing the price su±ciently to preclude parallel trade.
In the accommodation equilibrium the price di®erence between the foreign and home markets admits pro¯table arbitrage in the last stage and the parallelimporting¯rms undercut the manufacturing¯rm's price in the home market su±ciently to sell its whole capacity. Working backwards we may focus on the home market in the¯rst stage. The result from the last stage is a residual demand for the manufacturing¯rm's product in the home market and the manufacturing¯rm solves
The optimum price is
which we call the accommodation price. Interestingly, the accommodation price is falling in the volume of parallel trade, so long as parallel imports are positive.
The equilibrium pro¯t may be obtained by inserting the accommodation price in the pro¯t function. Correspondingly, we obtain the deterrence pro¯t by inserting the deterrence price, p m h = b p f + t , in the pro¯t function. The two pro¯t levels give a condition for deterrence
where the left hand side is the pro¯t in the accommodation equilibrium and the right hand side is the pro¯t from deterrence. For su±ciently small k, the pro¯t from accommodation falls in the volume of arbitrage. 4 The pro¯t from deterrence increases in the trade cost. In other words, accommodation is relatively more attractive when the potential volume of parallel trade is small and the trade cost is relatively high. More formally, we have the following result:
Proposition 2 For a su±ciently small k and t, the manufacturing¯rm chooses not to deter parallel imports. Moreover, the equilibrium price set by the manufacturing¯rm in the home market is falling in the actual volume of parallel imports.
Proof. De¯ne the pro¯t from accommodation minus the pro¯t of deterrence to be
which is (strictly) positive for k = 0; t = 0. For any k the function is neg-
For any given t, it is negative for k > ®. From the theorem of intermediate values it follows that there exist a function k (t) such that f (k (t) ; t) = 0 and for k < k (t) accommodation is more pro¯table than deterrence. Moreover, in this equilibrium the manufacturer's price in the home market is falling in the volume of parallel imports as dp m h dk = ¡ 1 2¯h < 0 which concludes the proof.
The main intuition for the result is straightforward. First, a small potential volume of parallel imports hurts the manufacturing¯rm's revenue less in the accommodation equilibrium than does a large volume. A high trade cost, on the other hand, makes deterrence relatively easy and, thus, less costly for the manufacturing¯rm. A combination of these two e®ects gives the main result. Second, the accommodation price falls in the volume of arbitrage for a simple reason.
The direct e®ect of a price cut on revenues is smaller than in the segmented equilibrium since a share of the quantity is sold by the parallel-importing¯rms.
The manufacturing¯rm does not internalize the e®ect on the parallel-importinḡ rms' pro¯t in reaching its pricing decision in the accommodation equilibrium.
In the accommodation equilibrium the manufacturing¯rm sets a price that is a function of the actual volume of arbitrage. A larger quantity of parallel imports results in a lower price set by the manufacturing¯rm, though it remains 4 We derive the maximum level of k for which this is true in the next sub-section.
above the deterrence price. The proposition, therefore, emphasizes that actual parallel imports, rather than potential arbitrage, may be essential for the degree of international price convergence. In the accommodation equilibrium the real resources used in arbitrage activities are increasing in the volume of parallel imports.
Note that the cost of obtaining price convergence is, however, not a continuous function in the potential volume of arbitrage and trade cost. A large potential volume and high trade cost makes deterrence more attractive to the manufacturing¯rm. More formally, Proposition 3 Let the volume of parallel import be limited to a maximum quantity of k and the cost of parallel imports be t. The manufacturing¯rm is more likely to deter parallel imports when the trade cost, t, is high or the potential volume of arbitrage, k, is large.
Proof. First, the accommodation pro¯t is falling in k d dk
and a combination of the two gives the proof.
The intuition for this result is similar to that for the previous proposition. A high trade cost makes deterrence relatively easy and a large volume of parallel imports makes accommodation costly. Hence, the manufacturing¯rm is more likely to deter if the potential volume of parallel imports is large and/or the trade cost is high. The last proposition establishes a link between the potential volume of parallel imports and the price e®ect in the home market, but no parallel trade is actually observed in a deterrence equilibrium. The real cost to obtain full price convergence is, therefore, kept at a minimum level. It is worth noting that high trade costs make deterrence more likely but the price e®ect of parallel imports in the home market is smaller. The reason is that the manufacturing¯rm need not reduce its price as much to deter parallel imports in the home market, since the trade cost helps to block arbitrage activities.
Strategic behavior by parallel-importing¯rms
In the previous section we showed that the manufacturing¯rm deters parallel imports when the potential volume of parallel imports is su±ciently large. This is clearly not a desirable outcome for the parallel-importing¯rms, which prefer an equilibrium in which the potential volume is limited and the manufacturinḡ rm accommodates. We now develop a formal justi¯cation for the existence of 
Second, a commitment to an upper level of parallel imports removes some of the parallel-importing¯rms' incentive to undercut each other in the last stage.
Competition between these¯rms in the last stage is, therefore, less aggressive.
Working backward, each parallel-importing¯rm non-cooperatively choose to order a quantity k ¤ i in the¯rst stage. If we restrict our attention to outcomes in which the manufacturing¯rm accommodates, the¯rst order condition is
where
is the sum of the ordered quantities by all other parallel-importinḡ rms than i. Considering only symmetric equilibria gives a total optimal ordered quantity k ¤ n , which is
The pro¯t-maximizing quantity, however, must be lower than the maximum potential volume of arbitrage or else parallel imports are deterred by the manufacturing¯rm. The maximum volume of arbitrage is not binding for low variable trade costs. The pro¯t-maximizing volume of arbitrage is less than the maximum volume of arbitrage, if t < t where
The critical level t is falling in the number of parallel-importing¯rms. The reason is that the pro¯t-maximizing volume increases with the number of parallelimporting¯rms while the maximum volume remains unchanged.
We summarize the formal results in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Let the ordered volume in stage one be a binding constraint on paral lel imports in stage three. In a symmetric equilibrium with n parallelimporting¯rms the total volume of parallel imports is k = min © k; k ¤ n ª and the manufacturing¯rm accomodates. In this equilibrium, the price in the home market is falling in the variable trade cost t and falling in the number of parallelimporting¯rms.
Proof. The parallel importing¯rm prefers the accommodation equilibrium
which is equivalent to e k < ® ¡ 2¯h (b p f + t). The maximum total volume of parallel imports in the accommodation equilibrium is k; given by equation (6) ;
and the optimal non-cooperative volume is k ¤ n ; given by equation (8) ; sub ject to the condition k ¤ n k. Now, for all b p f and t we have e k > min
which guarantees that the parallel-importing¯rms prefer the accommodation equilibrium over the deterrence equilibrium.
To show the last part of the proposition we can use proposition 2 in which the relationship between the home market price and the volume of arbitrage was established. Proposition 2 shows that the price set by the manufacturing¯rm in the home market falls in the volume of parallel imports. Now, the quantity of parallel imports depends on the variable trade cost and the number of¯rms.
More precisely,
and
which concludes the proof.
The result is interesting for several reasons. First, a relatively low variable trade cost makes deterrence costly and the maximum volume of arbitrage in the accommodation equilibrium is high. The pro¯t-maximizing parallel-importinḡ rms, however, prefers to restrict parallel imports to maintain a higher margin on the volume of parallel imports that actually take place. The volume of parallel imports is increasing in the number of¯rms due to the non-cooperative interaction between the¯rms. Each such¯rm will choose its quantity without regarding the e®ect on the pro¯ts of other parallel-importing¯rms. Second, as the variable trade cost increases the e®ect of parallel imports on the price in the home market is weaker and the equilibrium price is higher.
For a relatively low variable trade cost, the reason is that the¯rms choose a lower volume of arbitrage. The intuition is that the marginal revenue remains unchanged while the marginal cost increases, which results in a lower aggregate volume of parallel imports. For a relatively high variable trade cost, on the other hand, the reason is that deterrence is relatively less costly. The maximum accommodation volume is, therefore, falling in the variable trade cost and the equilibrium price in the home market is higher.
Our two cases our illustrated with Figures 1a and 1b. In both diagrams, the manufacturer sets the monopoly price p ¤ h in the segmented equilibrium. In so doing, the manufacturing¯rm generates quasi-rents equal to the area of the box below the line extending from p ¤ h to point A. These quasi-rents may be used to cover costs of R&D. In the deterrence equilibrium in Figure 1a , the manufacturer is forced to reduce price to the foreign price plus tari®. The result is a transfer from the manufacturer to consumers of area (® +¯) and a consumer e±ciency gain of ±. Furthermore, area (¿ + ½) re°ects additional rents to the manufacturer from the higher sales volume. Here, area ¿ ordinarily might be resources wasted in trade but there is no actual trade in equilibrium.
Although static welfare is higher in the home market, this simply re°ects the gains from wider dissemination of a monopolized good. Because quasi-rents in the deterrence equilibrium are lower than in the monopoly case, the issue for policymakers is whether the loss in quasi-rents, and the implied reduction in future R&D, outweighs the static gains to consumers.
In the accommodation equilibrium in Figure 1b , the parallel-importing¯rms sell the quantity k in the home market. The manufacturer acts as monopolist on the residual demand, generating an equilibrium at point C , with the manufacturer selling volume q h m . The consumer e±ciency gain is area ¾. The manufacturer loses quasi-rents equal to the box to the left of point A plus area¸1 (transferred to parallel-importing¯rms) and area ¿ 1 (lost to trade costs). However, that¯rm gains quasi-rents of area Â on additional foreign sales to support the parallel import volume. In this case pro¯ts of area¸2 are generated for the parallel-importing¯rms on additional consumption in the home market (with their total rents equaling area¸1 +¸2). Resources used in transport are the area (¿ 1 + ¿ 2 ). The manufacturer would be indi®erent between deterrence and accommodation where (for a given t), the parallel imports k are large enough to set residual marginal revenue equal to zero at price pf + t.
For lower import volumes the manufacturer prefers accommodation and for higher import volumes the manufacturer would deter. Because the parallelimporting¯rms understand this trade-o®, they would choose a limited trade volume. While there are necessarily static overall gains from deterrence (if not necessarily net dynamic gains), the home economy may be better o® or worse o® strictly in static terms from accommodation. Note that it matters for home welfare whether the parallel-importing¯rms are located abroad or at home. If they are home¯rms, the net static welfare e®ect at home is (¾ +¸2 -¿ 1 -¿ 2 + Â), whereas if they are foreign¯rms, the net static welfare e®ect at home is (¾ -
, assuming the parallel-importing¯rms absorb the transport costs.
Empirical Analysis
We now proceed to an empirical analysis of the price e®ects of parallel imports.
For this purpose we have collected detailed data about the pharmaceutical market in Sweden. The Swedish market provides a natural test for our theoretical hypotheses. As Sweden joined the European Union on the 1st of January 1995 the policy on parallel imports was drastically changed. Before 1995 parallel imports of pharmaceutical products were prohibited but they were allowed January 1 of that year. 5 The main data sample was provided by LIF, the Swedish Association of the Moreover, we have collected data on approvals to parallel import the products in our sample for 1995-1998. An approval is a formal decision by the Swedish Medical Products Agency and it allows a speci¯c parallel importinḡ rm to import a unique patented molecule in a speci¯c form and dose from a speci¯ed export country.
In the supplemental sample we have detailed prices for 26 of the 50 molecules in two main parallel-exporting countries, Italy and Spain, for 1995 and 1998.
These prices were obtained from IMS Health, a private consulting¯rm. The narrow sample was restricted to drugs that are precisely comparable on an international basis. Thus, they have the same ATC code, form, and concentration and originate from the same manufacturers across all markets.
The remaining parts of this empirical section are an overview of the pharmaceutical market in Sweden, an empirical analysis of the price e®ects in the Swedish market and,¯nally, a test of the price-convergence hypothesis between the export and import market.
The Pharmaceutical Market and Parallel Imports
The Swedish pharmaceutical market was approximately 0.8-0.9 percent of GDP valued at wholesale prices during the period 1995-1998. It ranged from 13.393 million Swedish Kronor (SEK) in 1995 to 16.567 million SEK in 1998, as summarized in table 1. Sales were relatively concentrated in a number of patented molecules. The 50 highest-sold molecules accounted for a third of the total market. In 1998 these 50 top drugs accounted for 37 percent of total sales in the pharmaceutical market valued at wholesale prices. Parallel imports have increased substantially since Sweden joined the European Union, both in terms of actual sales and approvals to engage in the activity.
In 1995 no parallel imports occurred and no applications to import were¯led.
By 1998 parallel imports had grown to 1.007 million SEK, which corresponded to 6 percent of the total market, and 226 approvals to import pharmaceutical A similar picture appears for approvals on a product basis. Approvals to parallel import drugs into Sweden in 1998 were concentrated in a few highvalue products. For 68.3 percent of all products on the top 50 list no entry of a parallel-importing¯rm had occurred. More than one approval had been granted for 21.9 percent of products.
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To summarize this overview we conclude that our sample covers approximately 38 percent of the pharmaceutical market in Sweden. The growth of parallel imports from 1995 to 1998 was considerable and such imports accounted for 16 percent of sales in 1998. A large and rapidly growing number of parallelimporting¯rms entered the market, in some cases to sell the same products as other¯rms already present. Overall, sales are largely accounted for by four major parallel importers. Parallel trade is concentrated in a minority of the products in the sample but the share of parallel imports is considerable for approximately 15 percent of the top-value products. Italy and Spain are the source countries for 63 percent of parallel imports. 6 Eighteen approvals had been granted for one speci¯c product. That this number could be so large has two explanations. First, for some products a speci¯c parallel-importinḡ rm was approved to import the goods from several exporting countries. Second, more than one parallel-importing¯rm had an approval to import certain drugs, possibly from the same exporting country as other such¯rms.
Price e®ects in the Import Market
Next, consider the e®ect of parallel imports in the Swedish market. We start with a comparison between products which are subject to parallel imports and products which are not. For this purpose we calculate the relative price change for a speci¯c product between a base year (1994 or 1997) and 1998. The relative price change is de¯ned as the price in SEK in 1998 divided by the corresponding price in the base year minus one. We calculate the change for the average price including parallel imports, referred to as the "Mean incl. PI", as well as the change for the manufacturing¯rms' prices. Table 2 reports the unweighted and weighted average price changes for all products. The unweighted average is a simple arithmetic mean. In the weighted average, however, product weights are computed as the product's sales in 1998 divided by the sum of sales for all products included in the average.
[SEE TABLE 2] Our discussion will primarily focus on the unweighted average. Over the whole period 1994-1998 prices increased on average 6.64 percent for all products and manufacturing¯rms' prices increased somewhat more at 7.34 percent. On average prices for products subject to parallel imports increased 2.88 percent while manufacturers raised their prices 6.38 percent for these products. As a contrast, prices for products not subject to parallel trade rose 7.57 percent.
The di®erence was even more pronounced over the shorter period 1997-1998. Average prices increased 0.25 percent. Average manufacturing¯rms' prices declined 0.34 percent for products sub ject to parallel trade but rose 0.95 for products not subject to parallel imports. Prices of parallel-imported products fell on average by 3.12 percent.
This¯rst overview seems to con¯rm that prices of parallel-traded products, and products facing such actual competition, fell in the import market relative to the prices of products not subject to parallel trade. The main e®ect, approximately three quarters of the fall, results from parallel trade itself while the remaining e®ect is the change in manufacturing¯rms' prices.
We undertake simple tests of the hypotheses generated by our two models.
First, to test whether the di®erences between the change in the manufacturinḡ rms' prices for products subject and not subject to parallel imports are signi¯-cant, we perform t-tests, assuming unequal variances, of the hypothesis that the mean change is the same. The hypothesis that the manufacturing¯rms' price changes for goods facing parallel imports and those not facing such imports is the same cannot be rejected at the ten-percent level of signi¯cance for the period 1994-1998 (t = 0:4324). The hypothesis is, however, rejected at the¯ve-percent level for 1997-1998 (t = 1:7679), which con¯rms that the manufacturing¯rms' prices increased signi¯cantly less for products subject to parallel imports than did prices of other products in the end of the period.
An additional t-test con¯rms that the mean price change for parallel-imported products was signi¯cantly lower than the mean for non-parallel-imported products for 1994-1998 (t = 1:6854) and 1997-1997 (t = 4:8160).
A third hypothesis, that the average change of parallel-imported goods and the manufacturer's price change for non-parallel-imported products is the same during 1994-1998 cannot be rejected (t = 1:0255). However, this di®erence becomes signi¯cant at the one-percent level for 1997-1998 (t = 2:6297) .
Our preliminary conclusion is, therefore, that the data support the model of accommodation rather than deterrence since the change of the manufacturinḡ rms' prices is not signi¯cantly di®erent between goods facing parallel imports and other goods. However, the mean price, including both parallel-imported goods and manufacturers' prices in those goods, increased signi¯cantly less than the manufacturing¯rms' prices not facing such competition. Over the short period 1997-1998, the change of the manufacturing¯rms' prices was signi¯cantly lower for products facing import competition than for other drugs. This result suggests that manufacturing¯rms react to the volume of arbitrage with a lag, rather than trying to deter parallel imports before they actually enter the market.
To investigate this¯nding further we examine statistically how changes in manufacturers' prices are a®ected by the share of parallel trade and the approval of parallel imports. We de¯ne PI SHARE, which takes values between 0 and 1, as the share of parallel trade in total sales for a speci¯c product. The variable APPROVAL is a dummy equal to one when there is at least one approval in 1998 to parallel import the product and zero otherwise. The dependent variable, de¯ned at the individual product level, is the relative price change of the manufacturing¯rms' price over the periods 1995-1998, 1996-1998 and 1997-1998 . [SEE 
Price Convergence and Rents
So far the empirical analysis has focused on the e®ects of parallel imports in the home market. More generally, however, we are interested in the e®ects of parallel trade on the price di®erential between the export and import markets.
In both the deterrence and accommodation cases we expect prices between the two markets to converge.
To test this hypothesis we use bilateral price comparisons between the Swedish market and the two main export markets, Italy and Spain. Prices are wholesale prices, that is, prices quoted to pharmacies, in U.S. dollars in 1994 and 1998.
These data include at least one pair of prices for 28 of the top 50 molecules.
Nine of the products were subject to parallel trade from one or both of the export markets. Regional varieties in the Swedish market that lack comparable products in the export market were excluded from the sample.
Relative prices for Italy and Spain were calculated on a product-by-product basis for 1994 and 1998. The relative price for a speci¯c product is de¯ned as the dollar price in the export country divided by the dollar price in Sweden.
The price change is de¯ned as the relative price in 1998 minus the relative price in 1994. Price convergence with this de¯nition occurs when the price change is positive. The dependent variable is the change of the relative price in Italy or Spain for all bilateral comparisons. The exogenous variable is a dummy, PI TRADE, which is one when parallel trade between the export and import country occurs and zero otherwise.
The estimated coe±cient for PI TRADE was 0.0180 for Italy, 0.0206 for Spain and 0.0176 for the pooled data. All three estimated parameters are insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero. Hence, the data do not support the hypothesis that prices for products subject to parallel trade converge between the export and import countries. More speci¯cally, we conclude that manufacturing¯rms' prices in Italy and Spain relative to Sweden did not converge during the period 1994-1998. Substantial price di®erences for parallel-traded products remained.
Indeed, the average price across Italy and Spain of these goods was 68 percent of the average price in Sweden.
Moreover, we can approximately estimate the di®erence between the price in the export market and the price set by the parallel-importing¯rm in the import market. Table 4 Finally, we use the margin and price e®ects to estimate the impact of parallel trade on consumer surplus and the rents that are shifted from manufacturinḡ rms to parallel-importing¯rms. The e®ect of parallel imports on the manufacturing¯rms' prices is -1.2 percent for the unweighted average and -3.3 percent for the weighted average, compared to products not subject to parallel trade over the period 1994-1998. Assuming that pharmaceuticals are normal goods, we obtain an upper bound of the positive e®ect on consumer surplus in 1998 by using the quantity consumed at the lower, parallel-import-induced prices, evaluated at¯ctitious prices had there been no parallel imports. The di®er-ence between the¯ctitious expenditure and the actual expenditure is the e®ect on consumer surplus. In this regard, the static e®ect of parallel imports on consumer surplus in 1998 is estimated to be a gain of 150 million SEK with unweighted price changes and 199 million SEK with weighted price changes.
The rents to parallel-importing¯rms (which include costs of the activity) are calculated using the actual margin between these¯rms' prices in Sweden and wholesale prices in the export market (Italy or Spain), multiplied by the quantity of parallel-imported drugs. In cases where the export price is missing it is replaced with the average export price, which is 68 percent of the manufacturinḡ rm's wholesale price in Sweden. Using these margins, we calculate the rents to parallel importers to be approximately 188 million SEK in 1998. Note that these rents are of the same magnitude as the consumer surplus gain.
Conclusion
We developed a model of manufacturer behavior in the presence of potential parallel imports. In the deterrence outcome we expect the manufacturing¯rm's price of a product that is sub ject to such competition to drop in the home market, though no actual imports would occur. More speci¯cally, we expect the price of products subject to potential arbitrage to drop relative to prices of products that are not subject to potential parallel imports in the home market.
In the accommodation equilibrium we expect the manufacturing¯rm's price to fall as the volume of parallel imports rises.
The Swedish market provides a natural laboratory in which to investigate our theoretical¯ndings. The growth of parallel imports from 1995 to 1998 was considerable and accounted for 16 percent of the sales in our sample in 1998. A large number of parallel-importing¯rms entered the market, in some cases to sell the same products as other such¯rms already present. However, paralleltrade sales were dominated by four major¯rms. Parallel trade was concentrated on a minority of the products in the sample but its share was considerable for up to 15 percent of major drugs.The source countries were primarily Italy and Spain.
The empirical analysis con¯rmed that prices of goods subject to import competition, including parallel-traded products themselves, fell approximately 4 percent in the import market relative to the prices of products not sub ject to parallel trade. Approximately three quarters of this reduction resulted from parallel trade itself while the remaining e®ect was the change in the manufacturing¯rms' prices. The simple tests for di®erences in price changes suggested that the accommodation reaction came with a lag, as the price reductions were signi¯cantly di®erent in the shorter period 1997-1998 than in the full period.
parallel trade converge between the exporting and importing countries. Our results suggest that parallel-importing¯rms exploit a price di®erence between these markets of approximately 21 percent of the original manufacturer's price in Sweden. Rents to the parallel-importing¯rms, or alternatively real resources used in arbitrage, are, therefore, considerable compared to the price e®ect in the home market. S ource: Statis tics on approvals com piled fro m data o bt ained fro m the M edical Pro duct Agency ( http:/ /ww w .mpa .se) , "Appr ovals" a nd sa les s tatis tics com piled from LIF data ( http:/ /w ww .lif.se).
No te: C 50 is de¯ned a s the fractio n of the s ales o f t he top 50 m olecules of tota l sa les o f pharm aceuticals. Sa les a re in nom inal whol esa le prices, i.e. price to pha rma cy (AIP), incl vet and ex cl ex tem pore. An o bservation of a n approval is de¯ned a s a form al approval to a s peci¯c¯rm No te: Std dev in par entheses. Data includes 16 4 di®erent form s a nd do sages dist ribut ed ov er 50 pa tented mo lecules. The rela tive price cha nges are calcula ted f or each uniq ue package. The price change fo r all¯rm s s elling a unique pro duct is a w eig hted averag e of the m anufacturing¯r m's price a nd the par allel im por ting¯r m's price. No te: Std. dev. in parent heses. The relativ e PI price in Sw eden is de¯ned as t he para llel im po rtinḡ r m's price relativ e to the price set by the m anuf acturing¯r m.T he narr ow sam ple includes m olecules w ith pr ice obseratio ns in the expo rt ma rket (Italy or Spain).
